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The invitation to explore “the new ‘illegitimacy’” necessarily evokes 
reflections about the “old” status or institution that supplies the point of 
departure.  “Illegitimacy”1 holds particular fascination for me because my 
encounter with this concept in law school introduced me to an idea that 
now informs much of my teaching and scholarship: law, as one aspect of 
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 1. The term “illegitimacy” conveys an opprobrium that many contemporary 
scholars reject.  I count myself among them.  Nonetheless, I use the term in this Article, 
and not always with quotation marks, because of its history and the invitation of this 
symposium to reflect on this history.   
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the broader culture, constructs identity.  Many years would follow before I 
understood that law and culture construct a host of identities beyond 
illegitimacy and legitimacy, such as gender, race, sex, and sexualities.  
Nonetheless, my study of illegitimacy as a second-year student stands out 
as my first glimpse of this particular function of law. 
The 1971 family law course that introduced me to this revelatory idea 
used a casebook that emphasized illegitimacy.  Published in 1966, Cases 
and Materials on Family Law by Caleb Foote, Robert J. Levy, and Frank 
A.E. Sander envisioned what they entitled “The Problem of Illegitimacy” 
as a microcosm in which the themes, tensions, and values pervading the 
entire course played out.2  Accordingly, the editors devoted an entire 169-
page first chapter to this topic, with separate sections of the chapter 
addressing such matters as public support of illegitimate children (welfare, 
then the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program),3 the 
“disposition of illegitimate children” (including surrender for adoption),4 
and procedural issues in disputed paternity cases (for example, the use of 
lie detector tests).5  The combination of this material with several important 
illegitimacy cases decided by the Supreme Court after the casebook’s 
publication,6 but assigned as supplementary reading, made coverage of this 
topic the centerpiece of the entire semester, commanding far more class 
sessions and attention than, say, requirements for a valid marriage or 
divorce. 
The editors’ treatment of the topic made plain a point that too often 
seems invisible or forgotten today, now that conventional wisdom 
identifies equality for children as the principal lesson of the demise of the 
old illegitimacy: illegitimacy—like the larger field of family law that has 
traditionally encompassed it—operates, by design, to regulate sex.  Hence, 
                                                          
 2. CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 7 (Caleb Foote et al. eds., 1966) 
(“[T]he law of illegitimacy typifies the whole subject of family law . . . .”). 
 3. See id. at 66-71.  In 1996, welfare reform replaced Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (reauthorized and revised by the Deficit Reduction 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006)) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections at 42 U.S.C.); see also infra note 72 and accompanying text 
(suggesting that the contemporary preoccupation with “personal responsibility” gave 
rise to the enactment of the 1996 federal welfare reform). 
 4. See CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 2, at 128-69. 
 5. See id. at 54-65. 
 6. E.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 539-41 (1971) (upholding, under the 
Equal Protection Clause, the exclusion of children acknowledged by unmarried fathers 
from inheriting by intestate succession); Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 
U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968) (invalidating, under the Equal Protection Clause, Louisiana’s 
statute denying recovery for the wrongful death of children born outside marriage); 
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70-72 (1968) (invalidating, under the Equal Protection 
Clause, Louisiana’s statute that excluded children born outside marriage from 
recovering for the wrongful death of their mother, while allowing children born to 
married women to recover). 
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for example, the casebook chapter on “The Problem of Illegitimacy” also 
included excerpts from the Kinsey Reports surveying contemporary sexual 
behavior,7 references to the assumed neuroses of many sexually active 
unmarried women,8 and data on the high rate of nonmarital pregnancies 
ending in illegal abortion.9  Such additional materials contextualize legal 
issues concerning the treatment of children born outside of marriage, 
reminding us of illegitimacy’s crucial role in a larger regulatory project 
aimed at sex. 
This Article’s analysis of illegitimacy brings the focus back to sex.  In 
doing so, this Article illuminates modern understandings of parentage and 
contemporary theories of family law.  Without explicit consideration of 
adult sexual behavior as an important site of regulation, readings of the 
Supreme Court’s case law on illegitimacy remain incomplete.  Only by 
giving a prominent place in the analysis to the state interest in regulating 
sex, particularly heterosexual intercourse, can we reconcile this case law 
with the doctrinal differences between the parentage rules for children 
conceived sexually outside marriage and those for children conceived 
without sex, by assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), outside 
marriage.  The sex/no sex10 “dividing line”11 that emerges demonstrates 
why returning the regulation of sex to the center of family law has far more 
explanatory power than alternative understandings of the field, such as 
theories that emphasize children’s equality or the privatization of 
dependency. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I revisits the earlier understanding 
of illegitimacy, highlighting its emphasis on sexual morality.  Part II 
explores the Supreme Court’s (partial) repudiation of the construct, 
offering several different readings of the case law centered on, respectively, 
children’s equality, parental identification, and personal responsibility.  
Part III tests these readings by examining their application in cases about 
two classes of children born outside marriage: those conceived by sexual 
intercourse, on the one hand, and those conceived by ARTs, on the other—
raising questions reminiscent of the “old illegitimacy.”  For the answers to 
these questions, this Part then turns to the state’s interest in regulating sex, 
                                                          
 7. CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 2, at 84-88 (citing ALFRED 
C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 287-304 (1953), and 
PAUL H. GEBHARD ET AL., PREGNANCY, BIRTH, AND ABORTION 78, 161, 178 (1958)). 
 8. See id. at 138, 141-42, 144 (discussing how social workers encounter many 
complex problems in assisting unwed mothers and address various psychological 
pressures and problems facing such clients). 
 9. See id. at 112 (indicating that up to ninety percent of nonmarital pregnancies 
end by induced abortion, as suggested by a study conducted by the Kinsey Institute). 
 10. For the meaning of this shorthand, see infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 11. See NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING 
ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 126 (2008) (criticizing marriage as the wrong “dividing 
line”). 
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which harmonizes the seemingly inconsistent rules of parentage for the two 
groups of children while highlighting the policy choices that always 
underlie such rules.  The Conclusion emphasizes how any regime of 
parentage necessarily creates illegitimacy of one form or another.  
Throughout, this Article shows how illegitimacy continues to provide a 
lens for examining the basic doctrines, theories, and constructed identities 
animating family law—just as it did forty years ago. 
I.  “THE OLD ILLEGITIMACY” AND ITS MESSAGE ABOUT SEXUAL 
MORALITY 
Illegitimacy has always, by design, operated as a means of regulating sex 
and, in turn, conveying a moral message about sex.  It has accomplished 
these objectives in several ways.  First, illegitimacy has served family law’s 
“channeling function,”12 seeking to confine sexual activity within marriage 
by creating a disfavored status for children conceived and born outside 
marriage.13  Second, its doctrinal and evidentiary supports—such as the 
presumption of legitimacy14 and Lord Mansfield’s Rule15—have covered 
up illicit sex, by treating a married woman’s offspring as the children of her 
                                                          
 12. Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 495, 498-500 (1992) (examining marriage and parenthood to illustrate family 
law’s “channelling function,” which “supports social institutions which are thought to 
serve desirable ends”); see also Susan Frelich Appleton, Toward a “Culturally 
Cliterate” Family Law?, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 267, 276-85 (2008) 
(“Today, family law claims to not repress sex, but to ‘channel’ it into marriage.”). 
 13. See Brief for the Attorney General, state of Louisiana as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 4-5, 7-8, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (No. 508), 
1968 WL 112828 (asserting that one method of encouraging marriage is to confer 
greater rights to legitimate offspring than illegitimate offspring).  For a glimpse of the 
evolution of academic treatment of illegitimacy before the Supreme Court intervened, 
compare Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477, 
477-82 (1967) (summarizing the rights afforded nonmarital children on the eve of 
Court’s 1968 decision in Levy v. Louisiana), with Kingsley Davis, Illegitimacy and the 
Social Structure, 45 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 215, 215 (1939) (describing “the bastard” as “a 
living symbol of social irregularity, an undeniable evidence of contramoral forces; in 
short, a problem—a problem as old and unsolved as human existence itself”). 
 14. According to this presumption, often described as one of the strongest known 
to law, a mother’s husband is the father of her children.  To the extent that some 
jurisdictions made the presumption conclusive, it operated as a substantive rule of law, 
not as an evidentiary  or procedural guide.  See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 
110, 117-20 (1989) (plurality opinion) (examining a California statute that 
“indisputably presumed” children to be  “of the marriage” when the mother is 
cohabiting with her husband, who is neither impotent or sterile); Susan Frelich 
Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-
Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 232-34 (2006) (“[W]e might think of the 
presumption of legitimacy as a default rule that determines parentage in the absence of 
further action, whether an attempt to rebut the presumption (in those circumstances 
permitting rebuttal) or proceedings to transfer parental rights to another.”). 
 15. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 119 (1971) 
(noting that Lord Mansfield’s rule “denies spouses the right to testify as to the 
illegitimacy of a child born in their marriage”). 
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husband, even when he is not the genetic father.16  Illegitimacy has long 
made marital sex normative and everything else second-class at best and 
deviant at worst. 
Illegitimacy’s moral message is unmistakable, as the following examples 
demonstrate. Consider, for instance, that in its heyday 
illegitimacy/legitimacy did not constitute a simple binary, but a 
complicated hierarchy with “adulterine bastards” and “incestuous bastards” 
the lowest of the lot.17  An especially disfavored category that developed in 
the United States was that of the “miscegenous bastard.”18  Thus, the 
immorality of birth outside marriage was a matter of degree reflected in the 
classification system.  In turn, not only social, but also economic, 
disadvantages imposed on the child hinged on his or her particular 
category.19 
A second illustration of illegitimacy’s moral message emerges from the 
story of how officials in southern states in the United States deployed 
illegitimacy for their own race-based ends in the years following Brown v. 
Board of Education.20  In doing so, they not only constructed identities 
based on marriage, sex, and immorality, but they constructed race and 
racial identities as well.  Legal historian Anders Walker documents how 
white opponents of desegregation seized on the notion that they could use 
immorality as a proxy for the race of those whom they sought to confine to 
separate schools, not directly challenging Brown, but circumventing its 
impact.21  Accordingly, they developed pupil placement laws designed “to 
keep black children out of white schools based on questions of moral 
                                                          
 16. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 201-02 (1985) (explaining how early English 
common law, through the presumption, elevated children’s interests and family 
integrity over paternal rights). 
 17. KRAUSE, supra note 15, at 2; see Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124 (plurality 
opinion) (citing H. NICHOLAS, ADULTURINE BASTARDY (1836)); JOHN WITTE, JR., THE 
SINS OF THE FATHERS: THE LAW AND THEOLOGY OF ILLEGITIMACY RECONSIDERED 89 
(2009) (noting how medieval canon law recognized five classes of illegitimates, 
determined by “the severity of the sexual sin of their parents”). 
 18. KRAUSE, supra note 15, at 2.  This was so even though earlier, during slavery, 
the mixed-race offspring born to slave mothers, often from forcible rapes by the master, 
were regarded as valuable property belonging to him.  See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, 
KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 23-
29 (1997) (identifying the “essence” of black women’s experiences during slavery as 
the “brutal denial of autonomy over reproduction,” with female slaves helping to 
reproduce the master’s labor force). 
 19. See, e.g., KRAUSE, supra note 15, at 77 (challenging the possible justifications 
for “giving the extramarital child lesser economic rights than are given the premarital 
illegitimate”) (emphasis in original). 
 20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 21. ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN MODERATES 
USED BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS 3-9 (2009); see also 
Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 73, 107-09 (2003) (noting the “convergence of race, sex, and class,” including the 
use in the 1960s of illegitimacy “as a proxy for race in implementing public policy”). 
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background,”22 with the legal identities of illegitimate and legitimate as 
valuable props in this undertaking. 
In attempting to make this strategy for replicating pre-Brown segregation 
ever more effective, Walker explains, political leaders in these southern 
states worked to abolish common law marriage and thus increase the 
number of children deemed illegitimate, knowing the impact of such moves 
would fall more heavily on African Americans than on their white 
counterparts.23  They understood that far more black children than white 
children would be unable to produce documents showing the formal 
marriage of their parents.  They also understood that, when white women 
became pregnant outside marriage, they typically surrendered the children 
for adoption—usually in secrecy in order to protect their own moral 
reputations and those of their families from the opprobrium of sexual 
transgression.24  Once adopted by married couples, then, these white 
children were deemed legitimate and thus cleansed of the stigma of 
immorality generated by their status at birth.25  By contrast, black children 
born outside marriage were usually reared by their mothers and extended 
families, thus increasing illegitimacy rates in this segment of the 
population.26 
In addition to these measures, consciously designed to boost black 
illegitimacy rates and thus provide an alternative basis for preserving 
racially segregated schools, southern political leaders explored other 
punitive interventions—all centered on illegitimacy.  These included 
proposed laws that would require sterilization of a woman after she gave 
birth to one illegitimate child, deem illegitimate children abandoned and 
neglected, make having more than one illegitimate child a crime, trigger 
                                                          
 22. WALKER, supra note 21, at 41. 
 23. For an examination of the different approaches to pregnancies outside 
marriage, before legalized abortion, in the white and African-American communities, 
see RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE 
ROE V. WADE (1992). 
 24. See ANN FESSLER, THE GIRLS WHO WENT AWAY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF 
WOMEN WHO SURRENDERED CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION IN THE DECADES BEFORE ROE V. 
WADE (2006) (presenting narratives from women who surrendered children for 
adoption).  Indeed, white babies were valuable commodities who would help white, 
childless couples in this post-World War II era of “compulsory parenthood.”  ELAINE 
TYLER MAY, BARREN IN THE PROMISED LAND: CHILDLESS AMERICANS AND THE 
PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 127-49 (1995) (documenting the post-war “baby craze” and that 
era’s social pressures favoring parenthood). 
 25. WALKER, supra note 21, at 79-81 (showing how white unmarried mothers 
could use maternity homes and adoption agencies that were unavailable to African 
Americans).  Adoption practice, then as now, replaces the child’s original birth 
certificate with a new one showing the names of the adoptive parents.  See Elizabeth J. 
Samuels, The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry Into the History of Adult Adoptee Access to 
Birth Records, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367, 375-78 (2001). 
 26. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 78 (citing TECHNICAL SUBCOMM. OF THE 
COMM. ON CHILDREN & YOUTHS, N.C. CONFERENCE FOR SOCIAL SERV., THE PROBLEM 
OF BIRTHS OUT OF WEDLOCK (1959)). 
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investigations of families with illegitimate children, and limit public 
assistance for families with illegitimate children.27  Other laws introduced 
at this time were designed to increase the regulation of marriage licenses 
and birth certificates, so that the former would be more difficult for African 
Americans to obtain and the latter would allow the tabulation of 
illegitimate births among African Americans.28  All of these initiatives 
sought to emphasize the lack of sexual discipline and hence moral 
inferiority of African Americans, justifying segregation.29 
These manipulative attempts to maintain racial apartheid provide 
important insights about illegitimacy as a legal and social construct.  Even 
if emphasizing the connections between race and nonmarital births 
reflected nothing more than crass political opportunism, these efforts 
highlight that sexual immorality constitutes the animating and taken-for-
granted core of illegitimacy.30  Outside the South, this view gained 
momentum as African-American communities and families were 
marginalized as exemplars of what the federal Moynihan Report dubbed 
the “culture of poverty”—a term that took particular aim at the unmarried 
motherhood and welfare dependency seen as characteristic of urban 
blacks.31  Accordingly, through the construct of illegitimacy, immorality 
was linked not just to race, but also to economic dependency on the state.  
Indeed, persistent emphasis on the low marriage rate of African-American 
women has kept these ideas alive, even if the description of the problem 
has changed over time.32 
                                                          
 27. See id. at 77-82 (examining efforts in North Carolina in the late 1950s to deny 
welfare benefits to nonmarital children). 
 28. See Anders Walker, Note, Legislating Virtue: How Segregationists Disguised 
Racial Discrimination as Moral Reform Following Brown v. Board of Education, 47 
DUKE L.J. 399, 410-18 (1997) (finding that adjusting the regulations on birth 
certificates served to raise reported black illegitimacy levels and “discredit[] traditional 
modes of black family formation”). 
 29. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 39-43 (documenting efforts in Mississippi in 
the late 1950s to perpetuate segregation by taking aim at the moral background of 
African-American students). 
 30. This seemingly obvious point is often eclipsed today by emphasis on other 
aspects of illegitimacy, such as the unfairness of unequal treatment of children.  See 
infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text. 
 31. See OFFICE POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, THE NEGRO 
FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965) (often called “The Moynihan 
Report” for short); see also Patricia Cohen, “Culture of Poverty” Makes a Comeback, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/us/18poverty.html 
(“Although Moynihan didn’t coin the phrase, . . . his description of the urban black 
family as caught in an inescapable ‘tangle of pathology’ of unmarried mothers and 
welfare dependency was seen as attributing self-perpetuating moral deficiencies to 
black people, as if blaming them for their own misfortune.”). 
 32. See, e.g., RALPH RICHARDS BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE?: HOW 
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE (2011) (urging 
interracial marriage as the solution to the dismal same-race marriage prospects for 
middle-class, educated black women); KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I 
CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE (2005) 
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II.  THE OLD ILLEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT: READING THE CASES 
In 1968, the Supreme Court began to dismantle much of “the old 
illegitimacy” in a series of cases finding “illogical and unjust” the 
punishment of children for the sexual transgressions of their parents.33  For 
example, in Levy v. Louisiana,34 the Court struck down Louisiana’s law 
denying nonmarital children damages for the wrongful death of their 
mother.35  Calling attention to the humanity and personhood of 
“illegitimate children,”36 the Justices could find “no action, conduct, or 
demeanor of theirs [that] is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the 
mother.”37  Put differently, in Levy, the Court saw no reason why a 
tortfeasor should avoid responsibility or the tort victims should forfeit 
recovery simply based on birth outside marriage.38   
Levy suggested that children have no control over whether their parents 
engage in sex outside of marriage and that, thus, they do not deserve legal 
disadvantages stemming solely from such parental behavior.  Later cases, 
however, articulated this principle expressly: “Obviously, no child is 
responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an 
ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.”39  Over the 
years, this idea has become iconic, even if the sentence expressing it leaves 
a number of assumptions unarticulated and unexamined.40 
                                                          
(explaining the rise of unmarried motherhood by documenting the value that poor 
women attach to having children and the criteria that these women use for identifying 
worthy marriage partners). 
 33. The Court first used the “illogical and unjust” language in Weber v. Aetna Cas. 
& Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972), which held that the denial of worker’s 
compensation recovery to children born outside of marriage violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
 34. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
 35. Id. at 72. 
 36. Id. at 70 (“[I]llegitimate children are not ‘nonpersons.’  They are humans, live, 
and have their being.  They are clearly ‘persons’ within the meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause . . . .”). 
 37. Id. at 72. 
 38. See id. at 71 (emphasizing that illegitimate children should not be denied 
constitutionally protected rights when they are subject to all of the responsibilities of 
citizenship, including the obligation to pay taxes). 
 39. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). 
 40. For example, the Court offered no support for its empirical claim that laws 
disadvantaging children born outside marriage did not deter the sexual activities of 
adults.  Even if the number of children born outside marriage showed that deterrence 
was not completely effective, the nonmarital birth rate might have been higher without 
such legal disadvantages.  Certainly, recent increases in the nonmarital birth rate might 
support such inference.  See infra note 102 and accompanying text (citing data showing 
an increase from 5% in 1960 to 41% in 2008).  Further, the Court’s language does not 
disentangle the effort to discourage nonmarital sex from the pressure to marry should 
such sex occur and result in conception, and even today the public discourse includes 
conversations about whether parents should marry for the sake of their children.  See, 
e.g., Should Parents Marry for the Kids?, Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/08/30/shotgun-weddings-vs-
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A.  The Children’s Equality Reading 
It should come as no surprise that one reading of the Supreme Court’s 
illegitimacy case law highlights the unfairness of penalizing children for 
the choices and actions of their parents, in turn establishing a legacy that 
makes equal treatment of children a recognized constitutional value.41  This 
“children’s equality reading” provides the point of departure for this 
symposium on “The New ‘Illegitimacy,’” which accepts as “an axiom of 
modern family law[] [that] children should not suffer as a result of being 
born to unmarried parents.”42 
Indeed, this reading is so powerful and compelling that it lends itself to 
applications well beyond marital status.  Thus, for example, the majority 
opinion in Plyler v. Doe43 invokes this reading of the Supreme Court’s 
illegitimacy cases to overturn laws that would deny public schooling to 
children who live in the United States as undocumented aliens, stating: 
“Even if the State found it expedient to control the conduct of adults by 
acting against their children, legislation directing the onus of a parent’s 
misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental 
conceptions of justice.”44  Of course, Plyler, like the illegitimacy 
precedents upon which it relied, did not foreclose alternative means of 
regulating “the conduct of adults” or discouraging “a parent’s 
misconduct.”45 
If the idea that children should not be penalized for the actions and 
choices of their parents extends beyond marital status, as Plyler illustrates, 
then questions arise about the limits of the children’s equality reading.  
Surely, not every inequality tied to parental conduct raises arguments likely 
to succeed under the Equal Protection Clause.  Indeed, children’s 
opportunities and futures under our current neoliberal regime,46 which 
                                                          
cohabitating-parents/.  Finally, the Court’s sentence fails to examine the highly 
gendered impact of laws disapproving of nonmarital sex, from which women bore a 
disproportionate share of shame and stigma.  See, e.g., FESSLER, supra note 24 
(presenting narratives that document this double standard in the context of pressure for 
unmarried white women to surrender their babies for adoption). 
 41. The emphasis on illegitimacy as an issue of children’s equality was a chosen 
litigation strategy.  See Davis, supra note 21, at 92-100 (describing how challenges 
came to focus on children born outside marriage and this strategy succeeded in 
achieving legal change, albeit limited). 
 42. The New “Illegitimacy”: Revisiting Why Parentage Should Not Depend on 
Marriage, AM. U. WASH. C.L., http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/ 
2011/20110325.cfm (last visited Sept. 26, 2011). 
 43. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 44. Id. at 220; see also id. at 238 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Weber, 406 U.S. at 
175 and Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)).  This language moots the 
unsubstantiated empirical claim in Weber.  See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying 
text. 
 45. 457 U.S. at 220. 
 46. See, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005) 
(defining neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that 
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couples parental autonomy with only a minimal government role in 
meeting economic needs, depend largely on parental choices and conduct; 
nonetheless, the Court has embraced such pluralism among families,47 
despite the life-altering and differential impact on children.48 
Wherever the outer bounds of the children’s equality reading might lie, 
however, we might tentatively posit that the Court’s precedents require an 
especially careful examination of laws tying a child’s access to benefits to 
the circumstances of his or her birth.  As the Court put it, “Obviously, no 
child is responsible for his birth . . . .”49  Beyond this starting point, 
however, the Court’s illegitimacy cases themselves suggest additional 
readings that help trace out the contours of the principle of children’s 
equality, as shown below. 
B.  The Parental Identification Reading 
In the wake of Levy, which left room to debate the governing standard of 
review,50 some commentators asserted that strict scrutiny should apply in 
illegitimacy cases because discrimination based on birth status is “imposed 
without regard to an individual’s actions or capacities and affect[s] persons 
who have no more control over their birth status than the black man has 
                                                          
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade,” with “the role of the state . . . to create 
and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices”). 
 47. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) (recognizing parental 
authority over children, including decisions whether to institutionalize them for mental 
health problems); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1973) 
(upholding the Texas public school finance system based on each district’s property 
taxes, despite disadvantages to children residing in poor districts); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205, 229-35 (1972) (upholding the right of Amish parents to exempt their 
children from high school, despite the possible limitations on children’s future 
opportunities). 
 48. See Anne L. Alstott, Is the Family at Odds with Equality? The Legal 
Implications of Equality for Children, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2008) (positing the 
tension between the commitments to equal opportunity and family autonomy, given 
differences in economic class and their impact on children); see also, e.g., Robin West, 
From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 
YALE L.J. 1394, 1409 (2009) (critiquing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), based on 
“the profoundly inadequate social welfare net and hence the excessive burdens placed 
on poor women and men who decide to parent”). 
 49. Weber, 406 U.S. at 175. 
 50. See John C. Gray, Jr. & David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the 
Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability 
Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2-19 (1969) (reviewing Levy and Glona to 
conclude that they provide a basis for challenging any law imposing disadvantages 
based on illegitimacy); see also Gareth W. Cook, Note, Bastards: Denial of Recovery 
for Wrongful Death Based Solely on the Illegitimacy of Either Claimant or Decedent Is 
a Violation of Equal Protection of the Laws. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1986); 
Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968), 47 TEX. L. REV. 326, 
329 (1969) (“[T]he Court in Levy held that the rights involved are basic civil rights 
involving the intimate, familial relationship between mother and child, and implied that 
the classification of illegitimates was, therefore, inherently suspect.”). 
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over the color of his skin.”51  Notably, however, once the Court addressed 
the issue directly, it chose intermediate scrutiny52—the same standard used 
for sex-based discrimination.53   
I have always understood this move, the choice of intermediate scrutiny, 
to communicate two important points.  First, like sex-based discrimination, 
classifications of children based on the marital status of their parents often 
reflect archaic and unfounded generalizations;54 these are especially unfair 
to the children, who have no control over their parents’ behavior.  
Certainly, the Supreme Court’s initial foray into this terrain—invalidating 
Louisiana’s wrongful death provisions that refused to recognize the 
mother-child relationship outside of marriage—reflected this rationale.55  
Whatever the state’s interest in channeling the sexual behavior of adults 
into marriage, the Court understood legal denial of the mother-child 
relationship as a constitutionally insupportable means. 
Second, however, by identifying intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate 
standard of review, the Court indicated that sometimes “real differences” 
justify classifications based on illegitimacy, just as in the Court’s view 
sometimes such differences justify classifications based on sex.56 The most 
                                                          
 51. Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 50, at 6. 
 52. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 465 (1988) (using intermediate 
scrutiny to invalidate, under the Equal Protection Clause, a statute limiting the time 
when children born outside marriage may sue to establish paternity and seek child 
support).  On the interplay between illegitimacy and sex-based discrimination, see 
Davis, supra note 21. 
 53. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279, 282 (1979) (using intermediate 
scrutiny to invalidate, under the Equal Protection Clause, a statute imposing alimony 
obligations only on husbands, but not wives); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98, 
210 (1976) (using intermediate scrutiny to invalidate, under the Equal Protection 
Clause, different ages at which males and females may drink 3.2% beer). 
 54. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 651-53 (1975) (invalidating, 
as a violation of equal protection, a provision of the Social Security Act that permitted 
widows but not widowers to collect special benefits while caring for minor children).  
Some of the most valuable cases in making the connection between sex-based 
discrimination and discrimination based on parental marital status involve both.  See, 
e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (finding unconstitutional a law 
that permitted adoptions without the consent of unmarried fathers, upon a showing of 
the child’s best interests, while requiring such consent from mothers, whether married 
or not, and married fathers). 
 55. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. Am. Guarantee & 
Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).  These laws, refusing to recognize the mother-child 
relationship, were unusual for their time even though, historically, children born 
outside marriage were deemed “filius nullius” or “son of no one.”  See KRAUSE, supra 
note 15, at 3-4 (defining term).  The NAACP’s amicus brief in Levy and Glona pointed 
out the racial discrimination worked by the laws in question.  See Brief for Harry D. 
Krause & Jack Greenberg et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Levy v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (No. 508), 1968 WL 112827. 
 56. E.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 469-72 
(1981) (plurality opinion) (citing females’ capacity to become pregnant as a difference 
justifying gender-based statutory rape laws); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the 
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1004 (1984) (using the term “real differences”).  
For critiques of such reasoning, see, for example, Kim Shayo Buchanan, The Sex 
Discount, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1177 (2010) (“The Court’s concern about 
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compelling candidate for a “real difference” applicable to children born 
outside marriage seemed to be the challenge of identifying the father.57  
Although the mother’s inevitable presence at birth eliminated any doubt 
about her identity,58 the Court’s early opinions allude to “lurking problems 
with respect to proof of paternity.”59  Even with the subsequent advent of 
exacting DNA tests,60 however, the possibility remained that the man had 
disappeared or the woman declined to provide evidence necessary to 
identify him.61  Because the presumption of legitimacy (in some states a 
conclusive rule62) always identified the father of children born to married 
women,63 but no similar default rule applied to children born to unmarried 
mothers, one could appreciate how the illegitimacy classification might 
occasionally be rationalized in particular contexts. 
Indeed, the Court has never said that all illegitimacy-based distinctions 
must fall, and a number of unsuccessful challenges to such classifications 
demonstrate the partial nature of the revolution.64  Melissa Murray’s 
valuable contribution to this symposium contends that the presence or 
                                                          
illegitimate pregnancy seems to have blinded it to the harm in leaving boys unprotected 
against sexual abuse, or to any inequality in allowing young men to have consensual 
sex with older partners, while criminalizing all nonmarital sex by young women.”); 
Law, supra, at 999-1001 (emphasizing that it is not just nature that imposes the burdens 
of teenage pregnancy, but also “the social and legal ethos that makes women solely 
responsible for nurturing the children they bear . . . .”). 
 57. KRAUSE, supra note 15, at 82.  But see infra notes 198-228 and accompanying 
text (challenging a purely genetic understanding of parentage). 
 58. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001) (“Fathers and mothers are not 
similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological parenthood.”).  Contemporary 
practices such as egg donation and gestational surrogacy challenge the assumption that 
maternity is always obvious.  See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005); 
Raftapol v. Raney, 12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 2011). 
 59. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 
456, 461 (1988) (recalling this problem). 
 60. See, e.g., Clark, 486 U.S. at 465 (recognizing the development of “increasingly 
sophisticated tests for genetic markers [that] permit the exclusion of over 99% of those 
who might be accused of paternity, regardless of the age of the child”). 
      61. Federal law imposes on recipients of public assistance an obligation to 
cooperate with state authorities in establishing paternity, with exceptions in certain 
circumstances.  42 U.S.C. § 654(29)(A) (2006). 
 62. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1989) (plurality 
opinion) (approving California’s then-conclusive presumption). 
 63. But see id. at 115 (noting that even the traditional conclusive presumption of 
legitimacy recognized some exceptions, as illustrated by the codification challenged in 
Michael H., which excluded cases in which the husband was impotent or sterile). 
 64. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275 (1978) (upholding the requirement of 
a judicial order of filiation for a child to inherit from his unmarried father by intestate 
succession); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799-800 (1977) (upholding the exclusion of 
the relationship of unmarried fathers and children from preferences under federal 
immigration law); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1971) (upholding the 
exclusion of children acknowledged by unmarried fathers from inheriting by intestate 
succession).  For an examination of illegitimacy-based discriminations that persist 
today, see Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination 
Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345 (2011). 
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absence of marriage-like behavior helps us sort the cases, explaining why 
some challenges to illegitimacy classifications succeeded while others did 
not.65  I agree that such analysis proves illuminating.  I would take the 
observation one step further, however, to point out that marriage-like 
behavior often serves the additional purpose of identifying a child’s father, 
based—of course—on a social understanding of “father” constructed in the 
shadow of marriage (with more on this point to come later).66 
Under this “parental identification reading” of the illegitimacy cases, 
concern about the difficulty of identifying nonmarital fathers remains a 
possible basis for laws distinguishing children born outside marriage from 
their marital counterparts.67  According to this reading, once outlier laws 
refusing to recognize for some purposes the seemingly obvious mother-
child relationship had been put to rest, so that the term “filius nullius” or 
“son of no one” no longer strictly applied,68 the focus of illegitimacy 
reform became the recognition of the child’s second parent.  Indeed, 
according to some authorities, to say that a child is illegitimate is to say that 
the child has only one parent.69 
This view of what the Supreme Court was trying to accomplish in this 
line of cases received an early boost with the 1973 Uniform Parentage 
Act’s (UPA’s) proposed network of parentage presumptions, including 
some applicable to children whose parents never married.70  These 
corrective measures synthesize the children’s equality reading with the 
parental identification reading, seeking to provide content for the former by 
facilitating the identification of a child’s second parent. 
C.  The Personal Responsibility Reading 
If the Supreme Court’s decisions and the 1973 UPA were child-
focused—developments designed to help children of unmarried parents 
achieve parity with other children—they also offered welcome changes for 
the state itself, paving the way for the increasing privatization of 
dependency.  The identification and recognition of unmarried fathers as 
parents helped to transform critiques about the “culture of poverty”71 into a 
preoccupation with “personal responsibility,” a theme that suggests still 
                                                          
 65. See Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 387 (2012). 
 66. See infra notes 209-19 and accompanying text. 
 67. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 56 (2001) (showcasing this assumption 
by the majority in Nguyen). 
 68. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 69. See H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d 206, 210 (N.Y. 2010) (Smith, J., concurring). 
 70. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 393-94 (2001); see also 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23-24 (Supp. 2011) 
(including presumptions in new, updated UPA). 
 71. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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another reading of the Supreme Court case law.  This new preoccupation 
culminated in the enactment, in 1996, of federal welfare reform, 
specifically the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA),72 which Congress enacted to replace the 
more generous AFDC program with the more restrictive Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) system.73  TANF imposes work 
requirements and time limits on public assistance, allows disincentives for 
procreation, and strengthens measures to collect support from absent 
parents.74  Today, we see the same phrase in “Personal Responsibility 
Education,”75 the name for one of two federally funded sex education 
programs. 
What does “personal responsibility” mean?  The phrase seeks to 
communicate that participating in heterosexual intercourse has 
consequences, at least the risk of legally imposed child support obligations, 
as signaled by PRWORA’s emphasis on ever more aggressive measures to 
impose and enforce such obligations.76  While marriage provides one way 
to carry out such obligations, it is not the only way.  One alternative entails 
transfer payments between unmarried parents.  According to this 
understanding, licit sex no longer refers exclusively to sex within marriage, 
but also contemplates the use of birth control and/or financial support for 
any resulting children.77  Put differently, more personal responsibility 
means less government responsibility. 
This “personal responsibility reading” of the illegitimacy-classification 
                                                          
 72. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (reauthorized and revised by the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006)) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections at 42 U.S.C.). 
 73. See supra note 3. 
 74. See ROBERTS, supra note 18, at 202-45; Susan Frelich Appleton, When Welfare 
Reforms Promote Abortion: “Personal Responsibility,” “Family Values,” and the 
Right to Choose, 85 GEO. L.J. 155 (1996).  On the role of the federal government in 
this traditional matter of state family law, see Laura W. Morgan, A Shift in the Ruling 
Paradigm: Child Support as Outside the Contours of “Family Law,” 16 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIM. LAW. 195 (1999). 
 75. See 42 U.S.C. § 713 (Supp. IV 2010); cf. id. § 710 (separate program for 
abstinence education). 
 76. See, e.g., id. § 667 (state guidelines for child support awards); id. § 666(b) 
(income withholding).  These measures condition states’ receipt of federal funds on 
meeting specific federal conditions.  See also id. § 228 (federal Deadbeat Parents 
Punishment Act). 
 77. See, e.g., NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: 
LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 1-15 (2010) (describing a “blue 
family” model).  One can find echoes of “personal responsibility” talk in the 
controversy over whether women, even those working for church-affiliated employers, 
must have free access to contraception as part of federal health care reform.  See, e.g., 
Lauren Brown Jarvis, Religious Liberty vs. Reproductive Liberty: A New Political 
Minefield Pits Women Against the Church, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2012, 5:32 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lauren-brown-jarvis/religious-liberty-vs-
repr_b_1285607.html. 
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cases receives reinforcement from opinions spelling out the criteria for 
constitutional protection of unmarried fathers’ parental status.  These are 
cases in which observers see at work a “biology plus” test78 that conditions 
constitutionally protected parental rights for unmarried genetic fathers on 
specified conduct, which typically includes financial support.  For example, 
in accepting Peter Stanley’s challenge to the Illinois law that omitted 
unmarried fathers from the definition of “parent,” the Supreme Court noted 
not only that he had “sired and raised” the children,79 but also that he had 
supported them.80  By contrast, in ruling that unmarried father Jonathan 
Lehr failed to meet the behavior-based test to earn the right to object to the 
mother’s arrangement of a stepparent adoption, the Court juxtaposed 
Lehr’s never having supported the child81 with the prospective stepfather’s 
financial commitment, as evidenced by his marriage to the mother and his 
adoption petition.82 
The personal responsibility reading of the cases dismisses any notion 
that a child of unmarried parents should be regarded as “filius populi” or 
“son of the people,” entitled to public support, rather than “filius nullius” or 
“son of no one.”83  In turn, with marriage as the basis for child support 
duties out of the way, family law and policy could pursue in earnest the 
goal of privatizing dependency in all families.  Pursuit of this goal has 
meant that, despite theoretical tension suggested by the “biology plus” 
cases,84 biology alone suffices to make a sexually conceiving unmarried 
father personally responsible for child support.85  Accordingly, today courts 
                                                          
 78. See Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social 
Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 827-28 (2006) [hereinafter Jacobs, My Two Dads] 
(reviewing case law from the Supreme Court that ties fathers’ rights to demonstrated 
commitment and establishes a “biology plus” standard); Daniel C. Zinman, Note, 
Father Knows Best: The Unwed Father’s Right to Raise His Infant Surrendered for 
Adoption, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 975, 980 (1992) (using the term “biology plus” to 
describe the criteria for constitutionally protected paternal rights in the Supreme 
Court’s case law).  On the judicial development of the “biology plus” doctrine, see 
Janet L. Dolgin, Just A Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. 
Rev. 637 (1993); Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn’t Want to be Daddy 
Anymore: An Argument Against Paternity Fraud Claims, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
193, 207-08 & n.69 (2004) [hereinafter Jacobs, Paternity Fraud Claims]; see also 
Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 433 
(2007) (contending that the Court used the attributes and rights of motherhood as the 
model for the “biology plus” test for unmarried fathers). 
 79. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
 80. Id. at 650 n.4. 
 81. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 249, 252 (1983). 
 82. See id. at 259.  See generally Murray, supra note 65. 
 83. Blackstone used both terms.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *459. 
 84. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Laura Oren, The Paradox of Unmarried Fathers and the Constitution: 
Biology ‘Plus’ Defines Relationships; Biology Alone Safeguards the Public Fisc, 11 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 47, 101 (2004) (noting that, once an unmarried father has 
paid child support, he is then well-positioned to meet the “biology plus” test in any 
future dispute). 
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consistently hold unmarried men responsible for child support for children 
conceived during a sexual encounter on the same terms applicable to 
married fathers,86 whether or not the father has yet developed any personal 
relationship with the child.87  Moreover, this result obtains even when the 
man made clear before intercourse his intent not to become a father, when 
he received reasonable assurances that no conception would occur, and 
sometimes even when he fell victim to “birth control fraud” or the 
nonconsensual seizure of his ejaculate after the encounter.88  Courts in such 
cases regard the man’s decision to engage in the sexual encounter as the 
“cause” of the financial obligation89 and deem the man’s child support 
obligations a rational response to legitimate state interests.90 
Consistent with this causation-based approach, in 2005, in Elisa B. v. 
Superior Court,91 the California Supreme Court upheld the child support 
obligations of a biological mother’s former partner, recognizing her as a 
second parent based on intent and conduct92 and finding “no reason why 
                                                          
 86. See, e.g., Walsh v. Jodoin, 925 A.2d 1086, 1087 (Conn. 2007) (holding that 
equal protection requires retroactive application of “family statutes [designed] to render 
the support available to a child of unmarried parents equal to that provided to a child 
whose parents have divorced”); Jackson v. Proctor, 801 A.2d 1080, 1090 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2002) (using the approach applicable to children of divorced parents to set a 
support award for a child of never married parents because support calculations cannot 
vary based on the parent’s prior marital status). 
 87. See Oren, supra note 85, at 117-18. 
 88. See, e.g., Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2007); N.E. v. Hedges, 391 
F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 2004); Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Doe, 125 P.3d 461 
(Haw. 2005); Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-2992, 2005 WL 4694579 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 
22, 2005); State v. Frisard, 694 So. 2d 1032 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Wallis v. Smith, 22 
P.3d 682 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001); L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 1983).  
See generally Jill E. Evans, In Search of Paternal Equity: A Father’s Right to Pursue a 
Claim of Misrepresentation of Fertility, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1045 (2005); Donald C. 
Hubin, Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling the Puzzles of Paternity, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 29 (2003); Brenda Saiz, Tort Law: Tort Liability When Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation Regarding Birth Control Results in the Birth of a Healthy Child—
Wallis v. Smith, 32 N.M. L. REV. 549 (2002). 
 89. See, e.g., Dubay v. Wells, 442 F. Supp. 2d 404, 410 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“[T]he 
State played no role in the conception or birth of the child in this case, or in the 
decisions that resulted in the birth of the child.”), aff’d 506 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2007); cf. 
Scott Altman, A Theory of Child Support, 17 INT’L J. L. POL’Y & FAM. 173 (2003); 
Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 Ga. L. 
Rev. 649 (2008); Ira Mark Ellman & Tara O’Toole Ellman, The Theory of Child 
Support, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 107, 129 (2008) (all exploring theoretical bases of child 
support obligations).  But see Dubay, 506 F.3d at 430 n.4 (affirming the district court 
while correcting its statement that biology alone creates liability for child support: 
“[The statute] thus does more than simply ‘confirm a biological fact’—it establishes 
that the putative father is the legal father, which gives rise to legal consequences.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 90. See, e.g., Dubay, 506 F.3d at 430; Doe, 125 P.3d at 472. 
 91. 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005). 
 92. The California Supreme Court had previously used this approach to resolve a 
dispute between genetic and intended parents versus the gestational surrogate who had 
agreed to carry the pregnancy for them.  See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 
1993) (resolving conflicting indicia of maternity by looking to intent after stating, 
“[b]ut for [the parties’] acted-on intention, the child would not exist”). 
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both parents of a child cannot be women.”93  Not coincidentally, the push 
for this outcome came from the state itself, after Elisa’s partner and the 
twins began receiving public assistance.94 
Such developments reinforce the claim that the privatization of 
dependency has become the central pillar of family law.95  According to 
numerous analyses and critiques, family law’s doctrines, values, and 
policies—from the channeling of sex into marriage to the elevated place of 
both marriage and parental autonomy96—all contribute by design to a 
regime in which the state has virtually no obligation for care-giving and 
support of vulnerable young members of the population.97 
Even if the strongest evidence for this hypothesis once lay in family 
law’s emphasis on the marital family, certainly the modern rhetoric of 
personal responsibility and its implementation reveal that keeping 
dependency private is a policy that now extends well beyond marriage.  As 
modern family law recognizes increasingly diverse family forms,98 then, it 
                                                          
 93. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666.  See also H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d 206, 208-09 
(N.Y. 2010) (holding that the family court has jurisdiction to impose a child support 
obligation on the mother’s former same-sex partner). 
 94. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 672.  The county’s district attorney brought the suit.  Id. at 
662. 
 95. E.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY (2004); Anne L. Alstott, Private Tragedies?  Family Law as Social 
Insurance, 4 HARV.  L. & POL’Y 3 (2010); Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, 
Family Feuds and the Privatization of Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 415 (2005); Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of 
Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181 (1995); Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: 
Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 1253, 1282-83 (2009); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. 
REV. 189, 193-94, 224-26 (2007). 
 96. Parental autonomy plays an important role in the privatization of dependency 
because of the “exchange view” of parentage, which treats parental obligations 
(including child support) as the moral basis of parental rights.  See Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 297-98 (1988).  For other 
“takes” on the relationship among parent, child, and state with respect to financial 
support, see, for example, Marsha Garrison, Autonomy or Community?: An Evaluation 
of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 41, 92-117 (1998) (evaluating 
different models for calculating child support); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, 
Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2418-19 (1995) (proposing the use of 
concepts from the law of agency and trusts to reconceptualize parental responsibilities). 
 97. See supra note 95 (citing authorities).  Children born to never-married parents 
tend to experience more disadvantages than their peers born into a marriage because 
these children are more likely to be poor, more likely to need public assistance, and less 
likely to receive support than children of previously married parents.  See TIMOTHY S. 
GRALL, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND 
FATHERS AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2007 (2009), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-237.pdf; see also Daniel L. Hatcher, Child 
Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests of Children to the Fiscal 
Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029 (2007) (detailing how child 
support policies are not successful and harm children and their families). 
 98. See, e.g., POLIKOFF, supra note 11 (proposing recognition of a broad range of 
family arrangements); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) (proposing principles to govern financial 
consequences and allocation of responsibilities for children upon the dissolution of 
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emerges as a structure for making more and more of these arrangements 
independent of public support. 
III. TESTING THE READINGS AGAINST NEW CLASSIFICATIONS: CHILDREN 
OF SEXUAL CONCEPTION AND CHILDREN CONCEIVED WITHOUT SEX 
If the Supreme Court’s rulings on illegitimacy decreased marriage’s 
legal salience, contemporary scholarship has decreased marriage’s 
importance to family law theory99 and to law reform.100  At the same time, 
empirical data show marriage’s decreasing prevalence in lived experience 
and in public opinion about family life—with only 52% of adults married 
in 2008 (compared to 72% in 1960),101 41% of children born to unmarried 
women in 2008 (compared to 5% in 1960),102 and a majority of survey 
respondents defining “family” to include various departures from the 
traditional norm of a married couple with children.103  Meanwhile, with the 
advent of constitutionally protected access to contraception,104 legalized 
abortion,105 and the proliferation of ARTs,106 sex and reproduction now 
represent quite distinct activities and objectives. 
With the fading prominence of marriage and reproductive sex in all 
facets of family law, other classifications and points of distinction become 
more visible.  Although the “new illegitimacy” prompting this symposium 
stems from the reinvigorated emphasis on parental marital status in recent 
                                                          
marriages and some nonmarital relationships).  For some of the advantages for children 
in recognizing multiple parents, see Laura Nicole Althouse, Three’s Company? How 
American Law Can Recognize a Third Social Parent in Same-Sex Headed Families, 19 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 171 (2008); Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple 
Fathers, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 231 (2007); Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth: 
Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 909 (2006); 
Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and 
Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 327-32 
(2007). 
 99. E.g., Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31 
(2006); Laura T. Kessler, New Frontiers in Family Law, in TRANSCENDING THE 
BOUNDARIES OF LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 226 (Martha 
Albertson Fineman ed., 2011) (examining trends in contemporary family law); 
Rosenbury, supra note 95. 
 100. See, e.g.,  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 98. 
 101. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES 
21 (2010), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends-
2010-families.pdf. 
 102. Id. at 54. 
 103. Id. at 40 (“Nearly nine-in-ten Americans (88%) say a childless married couple 
is a family, and nearly as many say a single parent raising at least one child (86%) and 
an unmarried couple with children (80%) are families. A smaller majority say a gay or 
lesbian couple raising at least one child is a family (63%).”). 
 104. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 105. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 
(2007). 
 106. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005); Raftapol v. Raney, 12 A.3d 
783 (Conn. 2011); Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 
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cases about same-sex couples,107 other contemporary classifications of 
children raise similarly vexing questions.  This Part tests the various 
readings of the Supreme Court’s illegitimacy precedents by analyzing what 
emerges as possibly an even “newer illegitimacy”: the increasingly notable 
legal differentiation between nonmarital children based on the 
circumstances of their conception, either through heterosexual intercourse 
or through ARTs.  Does the truism acknowledged by the Supreme Court, 
“no child is responsible for his birth,”108 cast doubt on the doctrinal 
divergences currently dictated by the method of conception? 
The following analysis yields two important insights for our 
understanding of illegitimacy both old and new.  First, the regulation of sex 
persists as a governmental purpose, trumping other family law policies that 
have garnered far more attention in scholarly and public discourse.  Indeed, 
child support may be conceptualized as a “tax” on heterosexual intercourse 
that does not apply to conception by nonsexual means.109  Second, as it 
always has been, parentage remains a legal construction; we cannot 
eliminate the distinction between legitimacy and illegitimacy without 
dismantling legal parentage altogether110—because legitimacy is simply a 
way of expressing whom the law recognizes as a child’s legal parent, while 
illegitimacy communicates the absence of legal recognition. 
A.  Complementary Readings: Children of Sex 
In many cases, the three readings of the Supreme Court’s illegitimacy 
cases—children’s equality, parental identification, and personal 
responsibility—work together seamlessly.  For all practical purposes, in 
terms of access to support and other benefits, parental marital status has 
become irrelevant for children conceived by heterosexual intercourse.   
Consider as an illustration Dubay v. Wells,111 a case about support 
obligations for a child conceived outside marriage.  Here, Matthew Dubay 
unsuccessfully challenged his legal status as the child’s father, despite 
                                                          
 107. E.g., Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010) (recognizing a 
biological mother’s former partner as a parent, only because of the couple’s formal 
civil union), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 908 (2011); see The New “Illegitimacy”: 
Revisiting Why Parentage Should Not Depend on Marriage, supra note 42. 
 108. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). 
 109. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 110. On the dismantling of parentage, see Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: 
Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 
385, 453-54 (2008); see also Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 60-62 (2008) (exploring this idea).  On the disaggregation of the 
“bundle” of parental rights and responsibilities, see Jacobs, My Two Dads, supra note 
78.  But see Katharine K. Baker, Marriage and Parenthood as Status and Rights: The 
Growing, Problematic and Possibly Constitutional Trend to Disaggregate Family 
Status from Family Rights, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 127 (2010) (questioning trend that would 
sever rights from family status). 
 111. 506 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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asserting that he had made clear his desire not to become a parent before 
sexual intercourse with Lauren Wells and that he had relied on her 
assurances about her infertility and her use of contraception as an extra 
precautionary measure.112  Wells became pregnant, chose to carry the 
pregnancy to term, and joined with the county to seek a paternity order and 
child support after Dubay maintained his refusal to become a father.113 
Once the paternity complaint and DNA evidence identified Matthew 
Dubay as the child’s father, state law made him personally responsible for 
child support, in turn achieving equality by according the child the same 
treatment that would belong to a child born of “legitimate” parents.114  The 
outcome, namely Matthew Dubay’s child support obligation, synthesizes 
all three readings of the case law, notwithstanding his arguments about the 
unfairness to him based not only on the circumstances of conception but 
also on a woman’s post-conception opportunity to “opt out” of parenthood 
by means of abortion or adoption surrender.115 
Moreover, cases like Dubay demonstrate that under all three readings, 
the Supreme Court’s illegitimacy precedents leave ample room for state 
efforts to channel and otherwise manage adult sexual activities so long as 
children do not suffer a penalty.  True, the judicial rhetoric in cases like 
Dubay conveys a punitive tone, but the court directs it at the father, not the 
child.116  For example, in a predecessor case in the same jurisdiction, relied 
upon in Dubay,117 the court of appeals described child support as a tax on 
conception and hence, implicitly, as a tax on heterosexual intercourse: 
Child support has long been a tax fathers have had to pay in Western 
                                                          
 112. Id. at 426. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See, e.g., Walsh v. Jodoin, 925 A.2d 1086 (Conn. 2007); Jackson v. Proctor, 
801 A.2d 1080 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002). 
 115. Dubay contended that state law denied him equal protection by disallowing 
men like him to extricate themselves from parenthood, while affording women the 
choice of abortion or access to “safe havens” for surrendering a child for adoption.  506 
F.3d at 428.  He had publicized his case as an effort to secure “Roe v. Wade for men.”  
See Ethan J. Leib, A Man’s Right to Choose (an Abortion)?, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 4, 
2005, at 60; John Tierney, Men’s Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, 
select.nytimes.com/2006/01/10/opinion/10tierney.html; see also Melanie G. McCulley, 
The Male Abortion: The Putative Father’s Right to Terminate His Interests In and 
Obligations to the Unborn Child, 7 J. L. & POL’Y 1 (1998).  On “safe haven” laws, see 
Jeffrey A. Parness, Deserting Mothers, Abandoned Babies, Lost Fathers: Dangers in 
Safe Haven Laws, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 335 (2006); Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven 
Laws: Legislating a Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 753 (2006); Lucinda J. 
Cornett, Note, Remembering the Endangered “Child”: Limiting the Definition of “Safe 
Haven” and Looking beyond the Safe Haven Law Framework, 98 KY. L.J. 833 (2010). 
 116. This punitive tone no doubt traces back to the crime of nonsupport and criminal 
bastardy proceedings.  See KRAUSE, supra note 15, at 109-10, 153-56.  For the history 
of the crime of nonsupport and the development of the modern approach to child 
support, see Drew D. Hansen, Note, The American Invention of Child Support: 
Dependency and Punishment in Early American Child Support Law, 108 YALE L.J. 
1123 (1999). 
 117. 506 F.3d at 429-30. 
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civilization.  For reasons of child welfare and social utility, if not for 
moral reasons, the biological relationship between a father and his 
offspring—even if unwanted and unacknowledged—remains 
constitutionally sufficient to support paternity tests and child support 
requirements.118 
Indeed, the child purportedly benefits from this tax on sex,119 if we accept 
as a given the premise that the state itself will not pay support. 
This analysis does not conflict with cases such as Stanley v. Illinois120 or 
Caban v. Mohammed,121 in which the Supreme Court struck down laws that 
disadvantaged unmarried fathers in their ability to protect their parental 
rights, compared to married fathers and unmarried mothers.  In both cases, 
by emphasizing not just the financial support that these men had provided 
but also the affective ties that they had developed with the children, the 
Court reached results that protected the children’s own emotional bonds 
and ensured relationship continuity.122  The Court’s failure to follow this 
apparent path in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,123 when the Justices rejected a 
challenge to the traditional presumption of legitimacy by a biological father 
                                                          
 118. N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004); see, e.g., Dubay, 506 F.3d 
at 430 (“[T]o the extent that Dubay claims that Michigan is not affording him equal 
protection of the law by denying men, but not women, ‘the right to initiate consensual 
sexual activity while choosing to not be a parent,’ . . . his argument must fail.”); Dubay 
v. Wells, 442 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“The consequences of sexual 
intercourse have always included conception, and the State has nothing to do with this 
historical truism.”), aff’d 506 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2007); Child Support Enforcement 
Agency v. Doe, 125 P.3d 461, 469 (Haw. 2005) (“The father elected a course of 
conduct inconsistent with the exercise of his right not to beget a child. The reproductive 
consequences of his actions were imposed by the operation of nature, not statute.”). 
 119. But see, e.g., Hatcher, supra note 97 (questioning benefits to children).  Cf. 
Stephen L. Carter, As a Compromise, How About a Federal Sex Tax?, BLOOMBERG 
VIEW, Feb. 17, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-17/as-a-compromise-
how-about-a-federal-sex-tax-stephen-l-carter.html (facetious proposal designed to 
argue for separation between church and state). 
 120. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 121. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
 122. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652-53 (“We observe that the State registers no gain 
towards its declared goals [of advancing child welfare and strengthening the minor’s 
family ties] when it separates children from the custody of fit parents.  Indeed, if 
Stanley is a fit father, the State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly 
separates him from his family.”); see also Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 (“There is no reason 
to believe that the Caban children—aged 4 and 6 at the time of the adoption 
proceedings—had a relationship with their mother unrivaled by the affection and 
concern of their father.”); id. at 393 (“In cases such as this, where the father has 
established a substantial relationship with the child and has admitted his paternity, a 
State should have no difficulty in identifying the father even of children born out of 
wedlock.”). 
 123. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).  In this case, the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
California’s conclusive presumption of legitimacy, which recognized the mother and 
her husband, not the biological father, as the child’s legal parents.  Id. at 123-27 
(plurality opinion).  As legal parents, they had the authority to prevent all contact 
between the child and the biological father even though the two had previously 
developed a relationship, such that the child called him “Daddy.”  See id. at 143-44 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
368 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 20:3 
who had forged a relationship with his daughter, helps prove the point.  In 
this case, the biological father lost his bid for continued contact with the 
child over the objection of the legal parents, the mother and her husband.  
Pulling no punches in its punitive tone toward the adult members of the 
“extraordinary” family in question,124 the Michael H. plurality opinion 
presented the presumption of legitimacy as a means of serving the 
particular child’s interests as well as those of society—with such interests 
understood to be advanced by the preferred family form of marriage125 and 
through the usual deference to the decisions of legal parents on behalf of 
their children.126 
Indeed, Michael H. demonstrates that when children’s equality, parental 
identification, and personal responsibility can be secured through 
traditional means, namely reliance on the marital family, laws that 
disadvantage or penalize “illegitimate parents” can survive constitutional 
scrutiny.  Put differently, the Court has never questioned a state’s ability to 
prefer and privilege marriage as the site of sexual relationships.127  Further, 
nothing in the Court’s illegitimacy precedents challenges a state’s authority 
to enact morality-based laws that discipline sex, even if more recent rulings 
require a more nuanced analysis of such measures.128  Rather, a narrower 
                                                          
 124. Id. at 113 (plurality opinion) (“The facts of this case are, we must hope, 
extraordinary.”); cf. Ariela R. Dubler, Constructing the Modern American Family: The 
Stories of Troxel v. Granville, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 95, 107-08 (Carol Sanger ed., 
2008). 
 125. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123-24, 123 n.3, 131 (plurality opinion) (invoking 
traditional protection of the “unitary family” and “the integrity of the marital union” in 
upholding the presumption of legitimacy); id. at 131 (rejecting the child’s equal 
protection argument for a protected relationship with her genetic father because the law 
makes her legitimate and recognizes her relationship with her legal father); see also id. 
at 135 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the trial judge found that “the existence of 
two (2) ‘fathers’ as male authority figures will confuse the child and be counter-
productive to her best interests”). 
 126. Id. at 131-32 (plurality opinion); see, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-
66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (protecting parental liberty to rear one’s children); 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (noting parents’ “high duty” to prepare their 
children for adult responsibilities and justifying parental authority over children based 
on law’s recognition that “natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best 
interests of their children”).  The legal principle that the Constitution protects parents’ 
authority to direct a child’s upbringing dates back to earlier cases.  See Pierce v. Soc’y 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 127. Certainly, the equal protection analysis in Eisenstadt v. Baird, striking down 
restrictions on access to birth control by unmarried individuals but not married 
individuals, gestures toward a rule of government evenhandedness without regard to 
marriage.  405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).  Even if Eisenstadt once conveyed that promise, 
however, certainly the myriad laws currently privileging marriage show how little has 
changed in the interim.  Indeed, in today’s challenges to laws excluding same-sex 
couples from marriage, courts routinely cite the many legal consequences that 
accompany marital status.  See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 903 n.28 
(Iowa 2009) (“Plaintiffs identify over two hundred Iowa statutes affected by civil-
marriage status . . . .”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-56 
(Mass. 2003) (noting that “‘hundreds of statutes’ are related to marriage and to marital 
benefits” and listing examples). 
 128. In striking down the Texas criminal ban on same-sex sodomy, Lawrence v. 
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lesson emerges from the three readings of the illegitimacy case law: 
penalizing children is an impermissible means of implementing efforts to 
shape parental sexual conduct and to send a moral message.129  By contrast, 
laws penalizing the adultery of the father in Michael H. and disapproving 
such conduct present no such problems,130 especially if the state steers clear 
of criminal punishment.131 
B.  Apparently Conflicting Readings: Children of No Sex 
Removing heterosexual intercourse from the fact pattern triggers a quite 
different parentage rule for children conceived outside marriage.132  Sperm 
donors need not pay the tax that sexually conceiving unmarried fathers 
must pay.133  Rather, agreements between sperm donors and clinics or 
between sperm donors and recipients ordinarily suffice to insulate a genetic 
father from recognition as a legal father even if, as a consequence, the 
child—born to an unmarried mother—will have no second parent and even 
when the identity of the genetic father is not in doubt and a lawsuit claims 
that the child needs economic support.  Thus, when conception occurs by 
ARTs, the compatibility of the three readings of the Court’s illegitimacy 
case law unravels.  Indeed, the parentage rule for many children conceived 
by unmarried women via ARTs stands at odds with each of the three 
readings, which simply do not apply when conception occurs without sex. 
                                                          
Texas found majoritarian morality an insufficient justification.  539 U.S. 558, 577-78 
(2003) (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its 
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”).  But, the majority’s 
disclaimers signal significant limitations on the holding, see id. at 578, suggesting that 
civil laws, as distinguished from criminal penalties, might well remain within 
constitutional bounds.  Moreover, even after Lawrence, the Justices have invoked 
moral concerns to justify particular criminal abortion restrictions.  Gonzales v. Carhart, 
550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 962, 979 (2000) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 129. Some read Lawrence’s invalidation of a stigmatizing prohibition, 539 U.S. at 
575, to reflect anti-subordination principles.  See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties 
of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99 (2007).  
This interpretation fits well with the conclusion that states may enact morality-based 
laws so long as they do not single out a particular class for opprobrium—such as gays 
and lesbians or children of unmarried parents. 
 130. Given the child’s status as “legitimate,” the Michael H. plurality saw no 
discrimination against her, despite the state’s refusal to recognize her relationship with 
her biological father.  491 U.S. at 131-32. 
 131. Whether or not the reasoning in Lawrence would invalidate criminal adultery 
laws remains uncertain. 
 132. Of course, I do not mean to suggest that the adults examined in this section do 
not have sex at all or even that “sex” refers only to penile-vaginal penetration.  Instead, 
by my use of the term “no sex” or my effort to “remov[e] sexual intercourse from the 
fact pattern,” I simply mean that the children in question are conceived without sex, 
using ARTs, typically alternative insemination but sometimes by in vitro fertilization 
(IVF) with donor sperm. Likewise, adults in the “sex” group presumably engage in a 
variety of sexual activities apart from their participation in procreative intercourse. 
 133. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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No doubt, the source of this particular parentage rule lies in the marital 
paradigm assumed at the time that donor insemination first attracted legal 
attention.134  For married women using donor insemination, the 
presumption of legitimacy and principles of estoppel typically have made 
her husband the legal father of the child, with the donor having no parental 
status.135  A number of states enacted the codification of this approach 
offered by the 1973 UPA, which expressly employed the language of 
“husband” and “wife.”136  These authorities apparently believed that only 
married women would use donor insemination or that the exclusion of 
single women from the governing legal principle would confine the 
practice to married couples.  Of course, today we see widespread use of 
ARTs by unmarried women, including single women and women in 
relationships with other women that are not formally recognized.137  
Although many states now have developed approaches that will recognize a 
woman’s partner or former partner as a parent or quasi-parent under 
appropriate circumstances,138 the subset of “illegitimate” children 
conceived by donor insemination and born to single women have only one 
legal parent. 
For example, in In re K.M.H.,139 a divided Kansas Supreme Court 
applied and upheld a state statute treating a sperm provider as “not the birth 
father,” absent a written agreement to the contrary with the woman.  In this 
case, the uninformed failure of Daryl Hendrix (a gay man reportedly 
hopeful about the opportunity to become a parent) to secure a written 
agreement from Samantha Harrington naming him as birth father left 
                                                          
 134. On the history of donor insemination, including the governing law, see Gaia 
Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at 
Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035 (2002). 
 135. The classic case is In re Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Surr. Ct. 
1973). 
 136. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 377, 407-08 (2001). 
 137. See, e.g., DIANE EHRENSAFT, MOMMIES, DADDIES, DONORS, SURROGATES: 
ANSWERING TOUGH QUESTIONS AND BUILDING STRONG FAMILIES (2005); Jennifer 
Egan, Wanted: A Few Good Sperm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, (Magazine), at 44 
(detailing the experiences of several single women who used donor insemination to 
have children).  Some same-sex relationships are not formally recognized because the 
couple lives in a state that restricts legally sanctioned relationships to heterodyadic 
marriages.  See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (West, Westlaw through End of 2011 
Session) (Virginia Marriage Amendment).  Others are not formally recognized because 
of the choice or inaction of one or both partners.  See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 
P.3d 660, 663 (Cal. 2005) (noting that the couple did not register as domestic partners). 
 138. E.g., Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666; C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1149 (Me. 
2004); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 98, § 2.03(1) (2002) (formulating criteria for 
“parent[s] by estoppel” and “de facto parent[s]”).  But see, e.g., A.H. v. M.P., 857 
N.E.2d 1061, 1073-74 (Mass. 2006) (declining to recognize parentage by estoppel); 
Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494, 499 (Va. Ct. App. 2008) (declining to recognize de 
facto parentage). 
 139. 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007). 
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Hendrix with no paternal status as to the resulting twins even though he 
went all the way to the U. S. Supreme Court in an effort to claim parental 
rights and accept parental responsibilities, including support obligations.140  
In rejecting his arguments, the K.M.H. majority interpreted the statute to 
advance state interests in “predictability, clarity, and enforceability.”141  
Explaining that the statute afforded Hendrix an opportunity to bargain for 
parental rights before providing his semen for Harrington’s insemination, 
the majority asserted that “the male’s ability to insist on father status 
effectively disappears once he donates sperm.”142  A divided Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court reached a similar result in Ferguson v. McKiernan,143 a suit 
for child support in which the court enforced an agreement relieving the 
man of all parental obligations that the parties entered before in vitro 
fertilization (IVF).144 
In these cases, then, the children each have one legal parent—precisely 
the outcome that Matthew Dubay unsuccessfully sought to achieve for his 
sexually conceived child and, according to some authorities, precisely the 
disadvantage that “illegitimacy” encompasses.145  An even more telling 
illustration of this differential treatment becomes apparent in a recent 
Indiana case, In re Paternity of M.F.,146 a suit for support for two children 
whom J.F., an unmarried mother, bore during a long-term committed 
relationship with a same-sex partner.147  After she and her partner split up, 
J.F. and the county joined to sue W.M., the children’s genetic father.148  
W.M. argued that he was a sperm donor who had helped conceive the 
children by alternative insemination and cited an agreement with J.F. 
relieving him of support obligations in exchange for his semen.149  J.F. 
counter-argued that W.M. had failed to prove that conception did not occur 
                                                          
 140. See In re K.M.H., 129 S. Ct. 36 (2008) (denying certiorari); Man Fights for 
Parental Rights, KCTV5-KANSAS CITY (Nov. 23, 2007), 
http://www.kctv5.com/news/14673759/detail.html (accessed archive at 
http://www.ottawamenscentre.com/news/20071123_rights.htm).  See generally 
Elizabeth E. McDonald, Sperm Donor or Thwarted Father? How Written Agreement 
Statutes are Changing the Way Courts Resolve Legal Parenting Issues in Assisted 
Reproduction Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 340 (2009) (analyzing the case and the policy 
issues it raises). 
 141. 169 P.3d at 1039. 
 142. Id. 
 143. 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1249 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (asserting that the 
majority’s approach violates state law prescribing legitimacy for all children); see also 
supra note 69 and accompanying text.  For a more detailed exploration of some of the 
contrasts in sex and no-sex cases, see Susan Frelich Appleton, Reproduction and 
Regret, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 255, 329-33 (2011). 
 146. 938 N.E.2d 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 
 147. Id. at 1257. 
 148. Id. at 1258. 
 149. Id. at 1257. 
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by sexual intercourse and that, in any event, such agreement would be 
unenforceable in violation of public policy—an invalid attempt by adults to 
bargain away the rights of these children.150 
As the court acknowledged, both parties had some Indiana law on their 
respective sides: For conception by alternative insemination, a contract 
relieving the donor of support obligations is valid and enforceable, if a 
physician performed the procedure.151  For conception by sexual 
intercourse, such agreements are invalid and unenforceable.152  J.F’s ability 
to secure a child support order against W.M. would depend entirely on the 
method of conception, of which there was no proof in this case.  There was 
a donor agreement entered into evidence, however, that clearly applied to 
the first child.153  Because J.F., the plaintiff, was seeking to avoid the 
contract, she bore the burden of proof but failed to carry it because she 
could not prove conception by sexual intercourse; hence, she lost, leaving 
the first child without support from W.M.154  For the second child, 
however, the agreement did not clearly apply, so the court remanded with 
instructions that the lower court grant J.F.’s petition to establish paternity, 
                                                          
 150. Id. at 1260. 
 151. Id. at 1259-60.  The Kansas statute applied in K.M.H. contains this requirement.  
In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1029 (Kan. 2007) (quoting a statute, which requires 
“semen provided to a licensed physician”); see also Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. 
Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986).  In M.F., the majority also emphasized the participation of a 
physician.  938 N.E.2d at 1261.  Of course, self-insemination is easily performed.  See 
Renate Duelli Klein, Doing It Ourselves: Self-Insemination, in TEST-TUBE WOMEN: 
WHAT FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? 382 (Rita Arditti, Renate Duelli Klein & Shelley 
Minden eds., 1984); Daniel Wikler & Norma J. Wikler, Turkey-Baster Babies: The 
Demedicalization of Artificial Insemination, 69 MILBANK Q. 5 (1991).  The physician’s 
participation performs a valuable evidentiary function, however, preventing any dispute 
about the method of conception (sexual versus medical) from devolving into a “he 
said/she said” argument, as M.F. illustrates.  Indeed, in M.F., both the majority and 
dissenting opinions agree that “informal, spur-of-the moment written instrument[s]” 
should not relieve a biological parent of support duties.  938 N.E.2d at 1261; id. at 
1264 (Crone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  For another case with 
evidentiary complications, see Adams-Hall v. Adams, 3 A.3d 1096 (Del. 2010); see 
also Browne Lewis, Two Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Paternal Obligations 
Between the Men Involved in the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 949, 984 (2009) (criticizing physician-participation requirement while 
explaining its evidentiary purpose); cf. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt. (amended 
2002), 9B U.L.A. 67-68 (Supp. 2011) (“The new Act does not continue the 
requirement [in the 1973 version] that the donor provide the sperm to a licensed 
physician.”).  Note that, today, some authorities prefer the term “alternative 
insemination” to “artificial insemination.”  E.g., MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, MAKING 
BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES: WHAT MATTERS MOST IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION, AND SAME-SEX AND UNWED PARENTS 80 
(2001). 
 152. M.F., 938 N.E.2d at 1260; see, e.g., Straub v. B.M.T. ex rel. Todd, 645 N.E.2d 
597, 601 (Ind. 1994) (rejecting father’s contention of “artificial insemination by 
intercourse”); State ex rel. Kayla T. v. Risinger, 731 N.W.2d 892 (Neb. 2007) 
(rejecting a genetic father’s argument that an agreement with the mother relieves him 
of support obligations to a child they conceived in a sexual relationship). 
 153. M.F., 938 N.E.2d at 1262. 
 154. Id. at 1260-61. 
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based on a presumption of conception by sexual intercourse in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary.155  The outcome: two siblings, both conceived 
in the same intimate same-sex partnership and with the same genetic 
parents, but one sibling has one legal parent and the other has two, with the 
different treatment based on the method of conception and its proof.156 
In all three cases, K.M.H., Ferguson, and M.F., there were judges who 
did not agree with the majority.  These minority opinions contended that 
parents cannot bargain away the rights of their children,157 that a focus on 
the interests of the children would have compelled a different conclusion,158 
and that family law policies requiring child support trump contract law 
policies honoring agreements.159  Examined through the lens of the 
Supreme Court’s illegitimacy precedents, these minority opinions 
collectively express concern that the circumstances of a child’s birth—or 
conception—determine the recognition (or not) of a second legal parent. 
Although these cases appear to stand at odds with the Court’s 
illegitimacy precedents and Dubay,160 calls for a new parentage rule for 
donor-conceived children of single women remain quite limited and have 
acquired little traction.  Over a decade ago, Marsha Garrison challenged the 
doctrine that permits a one-parent family through alternative 
insemination.161  Yet recent cases, such as K.M.H., Ferguson, and M.F., 
continue to reinscribe this doctrine, notwithstanding Garrison’s proposal 
for two parents for every child.  In addition to Garrison’s targeted critique 
of principles of parentage for donor-conceived children, one can find 
broader arguments for enshrining the heterodyadic162 marital family as the 
norm for all—by means of a proposed understanding of parenthood that 
                                                          
 155. Id. at 1261 n.1, 1263. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1249 (Pa. 2007) (Eakin, J., dissenting) 
(“I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion appellee can bargain away her 
children’s right to support from their father merely because he fathered the children 
through a clinical sperm donation.”). 
 158. Id. at 1249-51 (Eakin, J., dissenting) (asserting that children’s best interests 
require support obligation by the genetic father); In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1051 
(Kan. 2007) (Hill, J., dissenting) (“Who speaks for the children in these 
proceedings?”). 
 159. M.F., 938 N.E.2d at 1264 (Crone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
Judge Crone, however, does leave open the possibility that, in narrow circumstances 
and subject to clearly defined requirements, the donor might not have support 
obligations.  Id. at 1264-65. 
 160. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text. 
 161. Garrison wrote that in the context of sexual conception, “our legal system 
grants no parent, male or female, the right to be a sole parent.”  Marsha Garrison, Law 
Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal 
Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 906 (2000).  Thus, she argued that she could find 
no justification for “a policy that would invariably deprive technologically conceived 
children of two legal parents.”  Id. at 907. 
 162. See Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and 
Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 passim (2010) (using this term). 
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would integrate legal, social, and biological elements.163  Proponents of this 
approach urge family law to privilege this integrative model and to limit 
recognition of departures from this norm.164  Yet the prospect of moving to 
a legal regime based on these values seems slim, given family law’s 
trajectory, with the increasing authorization of same-sex marriage165 and 
recognition of an array of nontraditional, informal domestic arrangements, 
many of which include children parented by adults in the absence of any 
biological relationship.166 
Family law’s modern embrace of new family forms finds strong support 
among advocates of the principle of children’s equality rooted in the 
Supreme Court’s illegitimacy precedents.167  For example, Nancy Polikoff 
invokes the illegitimacy case law168 to make a powerful argument for 
family law to abandon marriage as the “dividing line” for official 
recognition and the distribution of rights and benefits169 and, instead, to 
adopt a “valuing-all-families legal system.”170  Polikoff proceeds to 
propound several guiding principles, including “plac[ing] the needs of 
children first”171 and “support[ing] children in all family forms.”172  
Similarly, Courtney Joslin criticizes the refusal of some jurisdictions to 
extend the parentage doctrines governing married couples’ children to the 
ARTs-conceived children of unmarried couples, including same-sex 
                                                          
 163. E.g., DAVID BLANKENHORN, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 155-57 (2007); 
ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, COMM’N ON PARENTHOOD’S FUTURE, THE REVOLUTION IN 
PARENTHOOD: THE EMERGING GLOBAL CLASH BETWEEN ADULT RIGHTS AND 
CHILDREN’S NEEDS, 10-15 (2006) (a survey of relevant developments in the United 
States and abroad, led by principal investigator Elizabeth Marquardt); Karen Clark & 
Elizabeth Marquardt, The Sperm Donor Kids Are Not Really All Right: A New Study 
Shows They Suffer, SLATE (June 14, 2010, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2256212/. 
 164. See generally WHAT IS PARENTHOOD? CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE 
FAMILY (Linda McClain & Daniel Cere eds.) (forthcoming 2013) (on file with author). 
 165. In 2012, Washington became the seventh state to allow access to marriage by 
same-sex couples.  See Reuters, Washington; Gay Marriage Legalized, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/us/washington-gay-marriage-
legalized.html?scp=2&sq=marriage&st=cse. 
 166. E.g., Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) 
(recognizing three legal parents, former lesbian partners and their sperm donor); N.R. 
Kleinfeld, And Baby Makes Four, and Complications, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/19/nyregion/an-american-family-mom-sperm-donor-
lover-child.html (describing the informal familial arrangement of a single mother, her 
son. and a gay male couple).  See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION, supra note 98 (proposing principles to govern the financial consequences 
and allocation of responsibilities for children upon dissolution of marriages and some 
nonmarital relationships); supra notes 137-38 (citing additional relevant authorities). 
 167. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. 
 168. See POLIKOFF, supra note 11, at 129-31. 
 169. Id. at 126-31. 
 170. Id. at 132. 
 171. Id. at 138-39. 
 172. Id. at 140-41. 
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couples.173  While ARTs-conceived children of married couples have two 
legal parents, the same result does not always obtain for ARTs-conceived 
children of unmarried couples.  Joslin challenges such discrimination 
because it disadvantages the children of nontraditional families and 
undermines these children’s wellbeing by denying them some “critical 
financial protections and benefits,” in particular, resources that an 
additional parent could provide.174 
These arguments, which sound in equality and recall the seductively 
incontestible idea that no child should be penalized because of the 
circumstances of his or her birth,175 are compelling.  Yet, taken literally and 
pushed to their logical conclusion, these arguments invite questions about 
another class of children: the ARTs-conceived children of single women. 
Because of the choices of their mothers and their genetic fathers, these 
children have no second legal parent or the “critical financial protections 
and benefits”176 that a second legal parent could provide.  Does the 
reasoning of Polikoff and Joslin require recognition of sperm donors as 
legal parents in such cases, notwithstanding the contrary intent of the adults 
who entered into the reproductive arrangement? Certainly, an emphasis on 
reproductive or family autonomy would provide an easy answer: no.  
Polikoff and Joslin, however, emphasize children’s equality177 and urge law 
to make irrelevant situations over which a child has no control.  Although 
the advocacy and scholarship of both Polikoff and Joslin leave no doubt 
that they contemplate something other than a purely genetic approach to 
legal parentage,178 their work necessarily poses a challenge: how to 
                                                          
 173. Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted 
Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177 (2010). 
 174. Id. at 1195; see id. at 1177 (“The Supreme Court has declared that children 
should not be penalized based on the circumstances of their birth.”); id. at 1228 (“Over 
the past forty years, many of the laws that once penalized children born outside of 
marriage have been eliminated or at least mitigated.”); see also Mary Patricia Byrn, 
From Right to Wrong: A Critique of the 2000 Uniform Parentage Act, 16 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 163, 214-20 (2007) (citing the Supreme Court’s illegitimacy precedents 
to criticize the failure of the UPA to recognize a mother’s partner as second parent of 
ARTs-conceived child); Maldonado, supra note 64, at 386-87 (urging “equality for all 
children . . . by extending the presumption of parentage to nonmarital children in cases 
where a person has held the child out as his or her own regardless of a biological link”).  
All of these authorities fail to explore the apparent inequality resulting from parentage 
laws applicable to single women (that is, those without partners) who use donor 
insemination, however. 
 175. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
 176. Joslin, supra note 173, at 1195. 
 177. This emphasis on children’s equality is reflected in the announcement for this 
symposium.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 178. For representative examples of such scholarship, see Courtney G. Joslin, 
Searching for Harm: Same-Sex Marriage and the Well-Being of Children, 46 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 81 (2011); Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt 
Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-first 
Century, 5 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 201 (2009). 
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reconcile the Court’s illegitimacy precedents with due respect for families 
that do not conform to traditional norms, in particular single women who 
use ARTs for the purpose of creating a one-parent family.179 
C.  Sex, Nature, and Law 
The challenge posed by the contrasting parentage rules for two groups of 
children conceived outside marriage, those from sex and those without sex, 
highlights three significant propositions.  All three illuminate not only the 
conceptualizations of illegitimacy, both old and new, but also the 
understanding of family law itself. 
First, the regulation of sex remains an important function of family law, 
and the policy of personal responsibility, with its connection to 
heterosexual intercourse, represents a modern instantiation of this 
longstanding legal enterprise.  The absence of support responsibilities for 
sperm donors reinforces this conclusion; in such cases, reproduction occurs 
without sex—leaving the state without the regulatory interest so strongly 
applied and enforced for sexually conceived children.180  Indeed, the 
divergence in the treatment of nonmarital children, depending on the 
method of conception, reveals that the regulation of sex has far more 
explanatory payoff than the privatization of dependency when it comes to 
identifying the core value or policy of contemporary family law.  The fact 
that family law permits some children conceived by donor insemination to 
have only one legal parent, even when they might need support, as in 
Ferguson and M.F.,181 confirms the limits of the privatization of 
dependency as family law’s theoretical foundation.182  The regulation of 
sex, however, harmonizes the determinative role played by the method of 
conception, providing a rationale for the unequal and hence apparently 
anomalous outcomes for the two groups of children. 
Second, to the extent the Supreme Court’s illegitimacy precedents focus 
on condemnation, punishments, and penalties imposed on undeserving 
children,183 the Supreme Court’s own bounded understanding of such 
                                                          
 179. See Egan, supra note 137. 
 180. Some readers will recognize the resemblance of this move to a part of the 
methodology of governmental interest analysis for resolving choice of law issues.  See, 
e.g., Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 
DUKE L.J. 171 (1959). 
 181. See supra notes 143-56 and accompanying text. 
 182. Hence, I disagree with Katharine Baker’s assertion that “there is a growing 
consensus that family law as a discipline is shifting from a set of rules designed 
primarily to regulate sexual relationships between adults to a set of rules designed to 
regulate parental relationships between adults and children.”  See generally Baker, 
supra note 89, at 651.  I would still place sex at the center of family law.  See Appleton, 
supra note 12, at 272-85. 
 183. E.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (“The status of 
illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible 
liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.  But visiting this condemnation on the head of 
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concepts helps explain why children conceived without sex who have only 
one legal parent suffer no penalty under the prevailing doctrines.  In several 
different cases arising in diverse settings—from challenges to funding 
schemes that subsidize childbirth for indigent women but not their 
medically necessary abortions184 to insufficient protection provided by the 
state in response to family violence185—a majority of the Court has taken a 
very narrow view of state action.186  Using this narrow view, the Court fails 
to see (or to goes out of its way to downplay) the state’s participation in 
creating the contested situation. 
A few notable opinions illustrate the pattern.  For example, in ruling that 
the Constitution does not require state funding for medically necessary 
abortions for poor women even when the state pays for childbirth, the 
Court reasoned that no deprivation of liberty occurs when government fails 
to “remove [obstacles] not of its own creation.”187  As the opinion explains, 
“[t]he financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman’s ability to 
enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the 
product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather 
of her indigency.”188  The Court accepted a woman’s poverty and, 
implicitly, her health problems warranting abortion189 as features of a 
“natural”190 status quo that the state did not cause and thus has no 
affirmative obligation to address.  In the process, the Court considered 
irrelevant the government support provided for poor women who carried 
their pregnancies to term.191  The Court has used similar reasoning to find 
                                                          
an infant is illogical and unjust.”). 
 184. E.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 185. E.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); 
see also Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
 186. See infra notes 187-97 and accompanying text. 
 187. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See id. at 339-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing the health conditions that 
may make an abortion medically necessary). 
 190. I put “natural” and related terms in quotation marks throughout this discussion 
to emphasize the indeterminacy of the term’s application. 
 191. See id. at 333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justice Brennan explained: 
[W]hat the Court fails to appreciate is that it is not simply the woman’s 
indigency that interferes with her freedom of choice, but the combination of 
her own poverty and the Government’s unequal subsidization of abortion and 
childbirth.  A poor woman in the early stages of pregnancy confronts two 
alternatives: she may elect either to carry the fetus to term or to have an 
abortion. . . .  By funding all of the expenses associated with childbirth and 
none of the expenses incurred in terminating pregnancy, the Government 
literally makes an offer that the indigent woman cannot afford to refuse. . . .  
[A]s a practical matter, many poverty-stricken women will choose to carry 
their pregnancy to term simply because the Government provides funds for the 
associated medical services, even though these same women would have 
chosen to have an abortion if the Government had also paid for that option, or 
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no state interference with constitutionally protected interests in cases of 
family violence even when state actors were inextricably involved in the 
events leading up to the violence.192  Thus, according to the Court, family 
violence arises exclusively from “natural” (not state) causes, even when 
child welfare authorities made the decisions to return a child to an abusive 
parent’s custody and to keep him there193 or the police did not respond to 
calls to enforce a judicial order of protection, despite a statute making 
enforcement mandatory.194 
In failing to acknowledge the state’s participation and in naturalizing the 
consequences that ensue in such cases, the Court has rejected arguments 
that the state is imposing a penalty for choosing abortion195 or that the state 
is depriving persons of constitutionally protected interests because of its 
role in the physical harm they have suffered as a result of family 
violence.196 Under this circumscribed analysis and the baseline that it 
uncritically assumes, a penalty or deprivation occurs only when the state 
interferes with or worsens the “natural” status quo for an individual or 
class.197  In setting a boundary between private and public, the Court has 
chosen an expansive view of the former and a blinkered view of the latter. 
The Court’s general approach, problematic and contrived as it might be, 
reaches beyond abortion and family violence.  In particular, it has 
implications for parentage and the status of the ARTs-conceived children 
                                                          
indeed if the Government had stayed out of the picture altogether and had 
defrayed the costs of neither procedure. 
Id. 
 192. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 193. Id. at 193-94; cf. id. at 205-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing state 
action in the facts of the case). 
 194. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 751-59 (2005); cf. id. at 
788 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing Gonzales’s entitlement to protection because 
“the statute’s guarantee of police enforcement is triggered by, and operates only in 
reference to, a judge’s granting of a restraining order in favor of an identified 
‘protected person’”). 
 195. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19 (explaining that disqualification from other 
benefits for engaging in protected activity would constitute a penalty, but failure to 
fund protected activity is not); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 n.8 (1977) 
(explaining why the state has not imposed a penalty in declining to fund elective 
abortions, while funding care incident to carrying to term and delivery). 
 196. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191; see Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 764-69 (rejecting 
arguments that a Colorado statute gave a mother an entitlement to enforcement of a 
restraining order in the face of fatal violence by the children’s father, so that police 
inaction did not violate due process). 
 197. See generally Susan Frelich Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive 
Choice: The Contributions of the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights 
Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1981).  Contrast 
the laws challenged in the abortion-funding cases, in which the Court found no penalty, 
with a mandatory maternity leave from employment, which the Court described as 
“penaliz[ing] the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a child.”  Cleveland Bd. of Ed. 
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640 (1974).  See also Perry v. Brown, 2012 WL 372713 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (holding California’s Proposition 8 unconstitutional because it withdraws 
from gays and lesbians the access to marriage that they previously enjoyed). 
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of single mothers.  The Court’s reasoning suggests that deciding whether a 
particular parentage scheme unjustly penalizes a class of children or 
unfairly deprives them of a second parent remains very much an open 
question, one that depends on identifying (or assuming) the baseline or the 
“natural” state of affairs.  Accordingly, we must return to the illegitimacy 
precedents to examine what the Court regarded as the “natural baseline” in 
terms of parentage for children born outside marriage so that laws robbing 
a given relationship of legal force would have been seen as penalizing these 
children.  Put differently, the question becomes whether the Court 
envisioned genetic paternity as the “natural baseline” in the illegitimacy 
case law. 
This inquiry in turn reveals the third significant proposition: parentage is 
anything but “natural.”  Traditionally, as well as now, genetics do not 
determine parentage,198 and many observers doubt the wisdom and 
desirability of reforms that would achieve such ends.199  In overturning 
discrimination based on illegitimacy, in fact, the Court has made clear the 
insufficiency of genetic connection alone for constitutional protection.200  
For example, the Court upheld the required performance of certain formal 
acts for an unmarried father to be recognized as a legal parent, such as 
obtaining a judicial order of filiation.201  Similarly, the Court developed 
what some observers call the “biology plus” test.202  By stating that 
biological connection merely creates a unique opportunity for achieving 
recognized parental status and requiring genetic fathers to undertake 
supplementary paternal conduct in order to gain constitutionally protected 
parental rights in the absence of marriage, the Court has left no doubt that a 
state may refuse to recognize a biological father as a legal parent when he 
merely provides genetic material.203 
                                                          
 198. For example, during slavery, law ignored the male owner’s genetic connection 
to children conceived through sexual intercourse, forcible and otherwise, with his 
female slaves and determined the status of children exclusively through gestation.  E.g., 
ROBERTS, supra note 18, at 23, 29, 267-68 (1997); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 
491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989) (“Illegitimacy is a legal construct, not a natural trait.”); Kerry 
Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples and the Rhetoric 
of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 9 (2009) (“Marriage [and 
illegitimacy] thus functioned . . . as a way for men to maintain sexual freedom without 
adverse consequences to themselves or their (official) families.”). 
 199. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 89; Jacobs, Paternity Fraud Claims, supra note 78; 
Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marital 
Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246 (2006). 
 200. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). 
 201. Id. at 275-76 (upholding a requirement of a judicial order of filiation for a child 
to inherit from his or her unmarried father by intestate succession). 
 202. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 203. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 
(1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 
(1972).  These cases regard biological connection as merely providing an opportunity 
to develop a relationship.  Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. 
380 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 20:3 
Today, the rise of doctrines that determine parentage according to 
function and performance push this approach beyond the notion of 
“biology plus.”  The more contemporary, functional approaches use 
performance not as an addition to genetic connection but as a substitute for 
it204—just as the presumption of legitimacy always did, with marriage as 
the required performance.  Indeed, albeit with divided opinions, a majority 
in Michael H. v. Gerald D. upheld the presumption of legitimacy against 
the constitutional challenge of a genetic father and daughter, who sought 
recognition of their relationship.205  As the Michael H. plurality opinion 
explained in rejecting the child’s claim to a relationship with her biological 
father, over the objection of the mother and the mother’s husband, this 
legitimate child suffers no illegitimacy-based discrimination, and 
“[i]llegitimacy is a legal construct, not a natural trait.”206  Now, in some 
jurisdictions, the very traditional presumption of legitimacy extends to 
nontraditional families, recognizing a mother’s wife or domestic partner as 
a legal parent.207  Further, the terms “natural father” and “natural child” 
legally apply even in the absence of genetic relationship.208 
The UPA has followed a similar path.  The 1973 UPA set forth a 
network of parentage presumptions applicable to children to whom the 
presumption of legitimacy did not apply.209  This network included 
conduct-based triggers, most notably a presumption of paternity arising 
from a man’s receiving a child into his home and holding the child out as 
his own.210  A revised UPA, first promulgated in 2000, attempted to 
respond to improved genetic testing and the proliferation of ARTs.211  This 
                                                          
 204. E.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); Shondel J. v. Mark 
D., 853 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 2006). 
 205. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).  In addition to Justice Scalia’s 
plurality opinion for four Justices, rejecting the arguments of the genetic father and 
child, Justice Stevens concurred in the result on the theory that the genetic father had 
received all the process he was due and that, on the merits, his claims were insufficient 
to overcome the presumption in this case or to gain access to the child over the legal 
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version retained the presumption of legitimacy based on marriage but 
initially eliminated the “holding out” trigger for paternity on the theory that 
genetic testing would identify the fathers of children born outside 
marriage.212  The drafters, however, then became aware that the elimination 
of this provision “could result in differential treatment of children born to 
unmarried parents.”213  In 2002, in order to “more fully serve the [UPA’s] 
goal of treating nonmarital and marital children equally,” the drafters 
restored the “holding out” provision, albeit with a new durational 
requirement.214   
Despite concerns about equal treatment, however, all the versions of the 
UPA specify that a donor of genetic material is not a parent, so long as 
certain requirements are satisfied,215 and the updated UPA’s treatment of 
ARTs contemplates situations when the child will have only one legal 
parent, a mother.216  Moreover, the UPA makes clear that such provisions 
do not apply to children conceived by sexual intercourse.217 
As this brief survey reveals, parentage has been and remains a legal 
construction, a social and political choice, not a biological inevitability.  
The state is inextricably involved, determining the criteria that make one a 
parent.218  Given the long history of the presumption of legitimacy in 
marriage, it should come as no surprise that alternative bases of parentage 
still include one or more ingredients that remind us of this legally favored 
relationship: sex, care, support, co-residence, and/or other familial 
performance.  Marriage casts a shadow even if its formalities are no longer 
essential for family recognition, as various observers have noted in 
evaluating contemporary functional approaches.219 
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The court of appeals in Dubay emphasized the state’s role in assigning 
parental status,220 correcting the lower court’s erroneous declaration that 
the state had nothing to do with the unintended father’s predicament.221  
Although the dissent in M.F. raised questions about the refusal to recognize 
the sperm donor as the father of one child,222 we might ask why the 
mother’s former partner, who would have been recognized as a parent in 
several other jurisdictions,223  bore no responsibility for support.  To say 
that this child in M.F. or the twins in K.M.H. and Ferguson suffer a 
discriminatory penalty based on the circumstances of birth, in 
contravention of the Supreme Court’s illegitimacy precedents, would 
require identifying a “natural” status quo that the state has infringed or 
worsened.  The very concept of parentage defies such efforts: a parent-
child relationship exists only when the state says it does. 
Perhaps, however, the analysis need not remain so hopelessly circular.  
The Court’s emphasis on parental performance in the “biology plus” 
cases,224 the role of conduct in the other illegitimacy precedents, and the 
rise of contemporary functional approaches to parentage all suggest that 
some hints of the “natural” family, the status quo, or the baseline might 
well be found in the ongoing domestic or domestic-like interactions that 
adults and children share.  Again, although marriage is not required, it 
provides a template for evaluating function and performance.225  When the 
state acts to disrupt or negate these subsisting arrangements, as it did in 
discounting the active role that Louise Levy,226 Peter Stanley,227 and Abdiel 
Caban228 had played in the children’s lives, the state penalizes those 
children, according to the Court.  By contrast, when the state chooses not to 
recognize a genetic tie, that is, when the genetic tie provides the only 
connection between an adult and a child, the state’s inaction works no 
interference and it imposes no penalty, in the Court’s view.  Under this 
analysis, the one-parent families created by donor-insemination laws do no 
represent a “newer illegitimacy.”  These were always one-parent families, 
so the state took nothing away. 
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CONCLUSION 
In overturning many laws that made marriage the dividing line for access 
to rights and benefits, especially for children, the Supreme Court’s 
illegitimacy precedents invite critiques of all laws that classify on the basis 
of marriage and that attach material consequences to the circumstances of a 
child’s birth.  The equalizing impulses at work here, however, often prompt 
us to forget the critical role of sex and sexual morality in illegitimacy.  
Even with the demise of many instantiations of the “old illegitimacy,” the 
state’s interest in regulating sex persists, with legal reforms extending 
support to children born to unmarried parents often framed not just as 
means for privatizing dependency but also as regulations of sex.  That such 
reforms do not apply to a subset of children born to unmarried parents, 
namely children conceived without sex, underscores the enduring power of 
the state’s interest regulating sex, while also exposing the limited 
explanatory value of children’s equality and the privatization of 
dependency in our efforts to make sense of family law’s modern trajectory. 
Hence, a regime that makes marriage the dividing line has given way to 
one that makes sex the dividing line.  Should this classification trouble us, 
given that a child’s parentage with all its legal consequences will depend 
on the circumstances of conception, in apparent contravention of the 
Supreme Court’s illegitimacy case law? 
One short response to this question would challenge, as a normative 
matter, the state’s continuing effort to discipline sex, notwithstanding 
judicial rhetoric protecting sexual liberty and privacy.229  Another short 
response would emphasize the autonomy of those who use donor 
insemination and other ARTs, including women who choose to have a 
child without a second parent.230  The first response is unsatisfactory 
because it fails to differentiate this particular regulation of sex, child 
support obligations for sexually conceived children, from all the others 
imposed by family law, which would require a thorough rethinking.231  The 
second is unsatisfactory because reproductive autonomy applies as well to 
sexual procreation, precisely the context in which the state imposes a “tax” 
in the form of child support, regardless of the choices of the participants.232  
Moreover, neither of these responses focuses on the children, whose equal 
treatment stood out as such a commanding consideration in the illegitimacy 
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precedents. 
Considering the impact on children of the sex/no sex dividing line 
requires a longer response that in turn raises additional questions.  As this 
Article has shown, determining when a particular connection between an 
adult and child receives legal recognition always constitutes a policy 
choice.  Indeed, some children might have two legal parents, others 
three,233 and still others only one.  Should we consider some of these 
children “legitimate” and other “illegitimate”?  Which ones?  Some 
children have adults who play important roles in their lives but the law of 
parentage excludes them, such as grandparents, stepparents, nannies, and 
foster parents.234  We can probably eliminate the last vestiges of 
illegitimacy—the law’s failure to acknowledge the reality of a particular 
child’s lived experience no matter how unique—only by dismantling 
parentage altogether.235 
Meanwhile, however, the choices that law makes about legal 
parentage—perhaps a less troubling and provocative term than 
“illegitimacy,” even if the inquiries share much in common—not only 
shape our understanding of family by acknowledging some connections 
and dismissing others; in doing so, these choices also construct the 
identities of the affected individuals, adults and children alike. 
In turn, these legal and policy choices reveal family law’s values and 
concerns, recalling the casebook editors’ claim many years ago that the 
“law of illegitimacy typifies the whole subject of family law.”236  To the 
extent that this insight remains valid, then, modern doctrines of parentage 
expose family law’s continuing interest in regulating sex even more than 
equalizing children and privatizing dependency. 
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